UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

11-18-2011

Newman v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 38281

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"Newman v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 38281" (2011). Not Reported. 107.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/107

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ID HO
JAMES EARL NEWMAN,

)
)
Petitioner-Appellant,
)
)
vs.
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
)
Respondent.
______________ )

OPY

NO. 38281

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CANYON

HONORABLE JUNEAL C. KERRICK
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

DEBORAH WHIPPLE
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay
& Bartlett
303 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-1000

JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
PETITIONER-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................. iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................. 1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Underlying
Criminal Proceedings ............................................................................ 1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of Post-Conviction
Proceedings ..........................................................................................4
ISSUE ..............................................................................................................7
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................8

I.

Newman's Claim That His Trial Counsel's Deficient
Performance Resulted In The Presentation Of An Absurd
Defense Is Not Preserved For Appeal Because It Was Not
Raised In His Petition To The District Court ............................... 8

II.

Newman Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's
Determination That His Claims Of Ineffective Assistance Of
Counsel Did Not Present A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact
Under Strickland ....................................................................... 10
A.

Introduction .................................................................... 10

B.

Standard Of Review ....................................................... 11

C.

Standards Applicable To Summary Dismissal In
Post-Conviction Proceedings ......................................... 11

D.

Newman Failed To Present Any Issue Of Material
Fact Requiring An Evidentiary Hearing On The
Dismissed Claims .......................................................... 13
1.

Failure To Obtain Test Results Of Swab
Samples From Sink ............................................. 14

2.

Failure To Interview And Subpoena The
"Second Participant" ............................................ 16

3.

Failure To Obtain DNA Testing Of Fingernail
Clippings And Scrapings ..................................... 17

4.

Failure To Meet With Newman And Provide
Discovery ............................................................20

5.

Failure To Challenge Admissibility Of DNA
From Trash Bag ..................................................21

6.

Failure To Communicate About Plea
Negotiations And Follow Directions To
Reach A Plea Agreement.. .................................. 23

7.

Failure To More Aggressively Pursue
Disqualification Of Judge ....................................24

8.

Failure By Appellate Counsel To
Communicate ......................................................25

CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................26
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .........................................................................26

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 960 P.2d 738 (1998) ...................................................... 12
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 102 P.3d 1108 (2004) ........................................ 12
Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107, 15 P.3d 820 (2000) ........................................................... 9
Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9 th Cir. 1978) ....................................................... 13
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 106 P.3d 376 (2004) ..................................................... 11
Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 61 P.3d 626 (Ct. App. 2002) .................................... 11
Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313,900 P.2d 221 (Ct. App. 1995) .................................... 11
Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 976 P.2d 927 (1999) .................................................... 22
Kuehl v. State, 145 Idaho 607, 181 P.3d 533 (Ct. App. 2008) ....................................... 13
Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P.2d 1272 (1991) .................................... 13
Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 892 P.2d 488 (Ct. App. 1995) .................................. 11
Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 835 P.2d 661 (Ct. App. 1992) .................................... 11
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 873 P.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1994) ............................... 12, 13
Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319,900 P.2d 795 (1995) ..................................... 12
Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 971 P.2d 1151 (Ct. App. 1998) ....................................... 9
State v. Adams, 138 Idaho 624, 67 P .3d 103 (Ct. App. 2003) ......................................... 8
State v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 808 P.2d 1322 (1991) .................................................... 8
State v. Newman, 2005 Opinion No. 510 (Idaho App., June 17, 2005) ........................... 3
State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 180 P.3d 476 (2008) .......................................... 12, 13
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ......................................................... 5, 10
Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 801 P.2d 1216 (1990) .................................................. 11
Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616 (9 th Cir. 1997) ........................................................ 13

iii

STATUTES
I.C. § 19-4903 ........................................................................................................ 8, 9, 12
I.C. § 19-4906 ................................................................................................................ 12
I.C. § 19-4907 ................................................................................................................ 11

RULES
I.R.C.P. 3(a) ................................................................................................................. 8, 9
I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1) .......................................................................................................... 8, 11
I.R.C.P. 15(a) ................................................................................................................... 9
I.R.C.P. 56 ..................................................................................................................... 12

iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
James Earl Newman appeals from the district court's summary dismissal of his
post-conviction relief petition.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings
Newman met Mary Coon and her husband, Torry, when he lived next door to
them in March or April of 2003. (#30796 Trial Tr., p.90, Ls.6-25.) On the morning of
June 27, 2003, Mary drove Torry to work - which took only 13 minutes - as the Coons'
three grandsons, Brandon, 1 Tye and D.J., remained sleeping in the residence. (#30796
Trial Tr., p.93, L.23 - p.94, L.8; p.97, L.24 - p.100, L.8.) When Mary returned home, a
man surprised her as she opened the front door, threw a white robe over her head, tied
her hands with a belt, and demanded to know if there was "anybody else in this house
besides those fucking kids." (#30796 Trial Tr., p.103, L.13 - p.104, L.25; p.105, Ls.2-3.)
Mary immediately recognized Newman by his voice as the man who previously
lived next door. (#30796 Trial Tr., p.108, L.19 - p.109, L.4.) Newman took Mary into
the master bedroom where she saw her husband's loaded revolver at Newman's feet
and noted he was wearing brown suede shoes.

(#30796 Trial Tr., p.107, Ls.10-12;

p.108, Ls.2-13.) Newman then secured the robe over Mary's head by tying the robe's
cloth tie around her neck.

(#30796 Trial Tr., p.109, Ls.8-19.)

Newman wore gloves when he tied her hands.

Mary noticed that

(#30796 Trial Tr., p.106, Ls.5-11.)

Newman fondled Mary's breasts under her shirt and brassiere, asking her if she liked
1

At the time of trial Brandon was nine years of age. (#30796 Tr., p.254, Ls.13-18.)
1

sex. (#30796 Trial Tr., p.112, Ls.11-25.) When Brandon knocked on the bedroom door,
Newman ordered Mary to "[t]ell the fucking kid to get back to bed," and Mary did tell her
grandson to go back to bed. (#30796 Trial Tr., p.116, L.9 - p.117, L.12.) Newman then
took her into the bathroom (#30796 Trial Tr., p.113, Ls.4-10) and removed her jeans
and underwear (#30796 Trial Tr., p.114, Ls.2-4).
Newman told Mary he had to take a "piss," unzipped his pants and urinated in the
sink next to her. (#30796 Trial Tr., p.114, Ls.5-12.) Newman bent Mary over in the
bathroom (#30796 Trial Tr., p.119, Ls.23-25) and started rubbing her vagina with his
bare hand (#30796 Trial Tr., p.114, Ls.13-25; p.123, L.18 - p.124, L.14).

Brandon

interrupted the sexual assault by repeatedly kicking the bedroom door. (#30796 Trial
Tr., p.124, Ls.15-23.)

Newman left Mary, opened the door and confronted Brandon,

eventually covering Brandon's head with clothing.

(#30796 Trial Tr., p.125, Ls.9-25.)

Newman secured the covering over Brandon's head by tightly tying a bootlace around
the boy's neck.

(#30796 Trial Tr., p.161, Ls.19-25.)

Brandon testified that the lace

made it difficult to breathe. (#30796 Trial Tr., p.257, Ls.9-15.)
Newman removed the Coons' truck keys and some rings from Mary's hands
before leaving the residence in the couple's pickup. (#30796 Trial Tr., p.156, Ls.6-17.)
When he left, Newman took Mary's clothing and the screen he removed from the
window to gain entry to the house. (#30796 Trial Tr., p.166, Ls.15-25.) Also taken from
the Coons' residence were guns, jewelry and other valuables. (#30796 Trial Tr., p.294,
Ls.10-16.)

2

The state charged Newman, by superceding indictment, with seven felony
offenses: burglary, Count I; robbery, Count II; battery with intent to commit a serious
felony, Count Ill; grand theft, Counts IV and V, and first-degree kidnapping, Counts VI
and VII. (#30796 R., pp.26-30.) A jury convicted Newman of counts I through VI, but
acquitted him of the first-degree kidnapping of Brandon.

(#30796 R., pp.63-69.)

Following a sentencing hearing (see generally #30796 Sent. Tr.), the district court
imposed the following sentences:
Count I, burglary: unified ten years with five years fixed;
Count II, robbery: unified life sentence with twenty-five years fixed;
Count Ill, battery with intent to commit a serious felony: unified fifteen years with
ten years fixed;
Count IV, grand theft: unified seven years with three years fixed;
Count V, grand theft: unified seven years with three years fixed; and
Count VI, first-degree kidnapping: unified life sentence with twenty-five years
fixed
(#30796 R., pp.90-93; #30796 Sent. Tr., p.166, L.21 - p.168, L.23.) The court ordered
all of the sentences to run consecutive to Newman's unified sentence of ten years with
three years fixed imposed in an unrelated case. (#30796 R., p.91.) The court ordered
the sentences on counts I, II, IV and V to run concurrent to each other.
further ordered the sentences on counts

111

The court

and VI to run concurrent to each other, but

consecutive to counts I, II, IV and V, for an aggregate unified sentence of fifty years to
life. (#30796 R., pp.90-93; #30796 Sent. Tr., p.105, Ls.1-11.)
Newman filed a notice of appeal.

(#30796 R., pp.95-97.) The Idaho Court of

Appeals affirmed his sentence. State v. Newman, 2005 Opinion No. 510 (Idaho App.,
June 17, 2005) (unpublished).

Although the Idaho Supreme Court initially granted

3

review (#30796, Order Granting Review 9/14/05), it subsequently determined the
petition for review was improvidently granted and ordered the unpublished opinion of
the court of appeals was final (#32275, Order, 1/6/06).

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of Post-Conviction Proceedings
On August 3, 2005, Newman filed a timely post-conviction petition alleging seven
instances of ineffective assistance of counsel, summarized by the district court as
follows:
(1)

failure to request and review discovery materials prior to trial and
failure to issue jury trial subpoenas for key pieces of DNA evidence;

(2)

failure to provide Petitioner with copies of his discovery materials
prior to and during trial so that the Petitioner could assist in his own
defense;

(3)

failure to communicate with Petitioner during trial preparation, only
visiting with Petitioner in jail and communicating with him a handful
of times;

(4)

failure to challenge the admissibility of DNA evidence from saliva
found in a trash bag even when there were obvious chain of
custody problems with the evidence;

(5)

failure to follow Petitioner's directions in attempting to reach a plea
agreement;

(6)

failure to more aggressively pursue the disqualification of Judge
Goff; and

(7)

failure by the appellate public defender counsel to communicate
effectively with Petitioner during the appeals process, resulting in
issues not being presented on appeal that may have been
successfully argued.

(#38281 R., Vol. 11, p.264; see #38281 R., Vol. I, pp.8-9.)

4

After the state filed an answer (#38281 R., Vol. I, pp.14-16), the district court filed
notice of its intent to dismiss Newman's petition, stating:
However, a review by this Court of the Petition filed in this action
reveals that it is not adequate to support a claim for post-conviction relief.
Even if the Court assumes for the purpose of addressing this issue that
Petitioner's factual allegations are true, Petitioner Newman has still failed
to establish a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's allegedly
inadequate performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different. Accordingly, Petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel fail to meet the standard set forth in Strickland [v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984)].
(#38281 R., Vol. I, p.20.)
Newman filed an amended petition with a supporting affidavit on November 30,
2005.

(#38281 R., Vol. I, pp.36--41.)

Although the amended petition contained

"essentially the same claims that were listed in the original petition" (#38281 R., Vol. II,
p.265), Newman's supporting affidavit made three specific allegations of ineffective
assistance by his trial counsel relative to the first claim of his original petition: (1) failure
to obtain test results, or seek independent testing, of swabs taken from the bathroom
sink for presence of urine and DNA; (2) failure to interview and subpoena as a trial
witness the other person Newman alleged was involved in the crime; and (3) failure to
obtain, and present at trial, the results of DNA testing (allegedly) done on scrapings
under Newman's fingernails to show the absence of the victim's DNA (#38281 R., Vol.
II, p.265). According to the state's supplemental argument on the court's notice of intent
to dismiss (with bracketed references to the record), the following events ensued:
. . . On December 22, 2005, the State filed a motion to strike the
amended petition and a motion to dismiss the claims for relief in the
amended petition. [#38281 R., Vol. I, pp.43-47.] Between January 2006
and February 2008 Mr. Newman's original post conviction counsel
5

withdrew, Mr. Newman hired new counsel and the parties each filed
additional written arguments regarding the motion to dismiss the claims.
[#38281 R., Vol. I, pp.64-68.]
On February 20, 2008, the court held a hearing on the issue of
summary dismissal. [#38281, 2/20/08 Tr.] The court took that matter
under advisement, but did allow some additional discovery and submittals.
[Id.] Without the court deciding the issue of summary dismissal, the case
was set for evidentiary hearing. [#38281 R., Vol. I, pp.159-160.] Current
counsel was appointed to represent the state as a special prosecutor.
[#38281 R., Vol. I. pp.155-157.] The court vacated the evidentiary
hearing. [#38281 R., Vol. II, p.170.] New counsel substituted into the
matter on Mr. Newman's behalf. [#38281 R., Vol. II, pp.171-173.] The
court subsequently rescheduled an evidentiary hearing. [#38281 R., Vol.
II, pp.186-194.]
The court further directed that the parties submit
additional affidavits or argument on the issue of summary dismissal
[#38281 R., Vol. 11, pp.190-194.].
(#38281 R., Vol. 11, p.230 (footnotes omitted) (citations to record in brackets).)
After the completion of discovery and the submission of briefs and arguments by
both parties, the district court issued a written order granting the state's motion for
summary dismissal of all the claims presented in Newman's amended post-conviction
petition.

(#38081 R., Vol. II, pp.262-295.)

order. (#38081 R., Vol. II, pp.298-301.)

6

Newman filed a timely appeal from that

ISSUES
Newman states the issue on appeal as:
Did the District Court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Newman's
petition for post-conviction relief given that the petition raised a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Newman received ineffective
assistance of counsel at trial?
(Appellant's Brief, p.13.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Is Newman's claim that his trial counsel's deficient performance resulted in the
presentation of an absurd defense not preserved for appeal because it was not raised in
his petition to the district court?
2.
Has Newman failed to show error in the district court's determination that his
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel did not present a genuine issue of material
fact under Strickland?

7

ARGUMENT
I.

Newman's Claim That His Trial Counsel's Deficient Performance Resulted In The
Presentation Of An Absurd Defense Is Not Preserved For Appeal Because It Was Not
Raised In His Petition To The District Court
On appeal, Newman argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for presenting
the absurd defense that Newman was not present at the Coons' residence when the
crimes were committed. 2 (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-19.) However, because Newman did
not present that allegation in any of his post-conviction claims to the district court, he
failed to preserve it for appeal.
It is well settled that issues not raised before the trial court will not be considered
for the first time on appeal. State v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 579, 808 P.2d 1322, 1324
(1991 ); State v. Adams, 138 Idaho 624, 628, 67 P.3d 103, 107 (Ct. App. 2003).
Constitutional issues are generally not considered on appeal unless they are properly
raised below. Adams, 138 Idaho at 628, 67 P.3d at 107. "No claim, controversy or
dispute may be submitted to any court in the state for determination or judgment without
filing a complaint or petition as provided in these rules .... " I.R.C.P. 3(a). The pleadings
must set forth the claims of the petitioner. I.C. § 19-4903 (petition must "specifically set
forth the grounds upon which the application is based"); I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1) (pleading
claims in civil action). Claims not asserted in the pleadings may not be considered on
appeal as grounds for finding error in the summary dismissal of a petition for post-

2

Conversely, Newman contends the only reasonable defense would have been to
have admitted he engaged in some of the crimes, but was not the person who sexually
assaulted Ms. Coon. (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-19.)
8

conviction relief. Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327,331,971 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Ct. App.
1998). Newman's petition, amended petition, and affidavits fail to assert a claim that his
trial counsel was ineffective because he presented an improper or unreasonable
defense at trial.

(See #38281 R., Vol. I, pp.8-10, ,1,1 7(b)-(h); pp.29-35 (Affidavit of

James Newman); 36-42 (first amended petition); pp.224-225 (Affidavit of James E.
Newman)). Inasmuch as Newman's appellate claim that his trial counsel was ineffective
because he failed to present a proper defense was never asserted in his petitions, it
was never properly raised to the district court and should not be addressed for the first
time on appeal.
However, after new counsel substituted for Newman's original post-conviction
counsel, she filed a reply to the district court notice of intent to dismiss, which for the
first time alleged Newman's trial counsel had "present[ed] a defense that was not
supported by the evidence .... " (#38281 R., Vol. I, p.123.) Claims asserted in postconviction proceedings, as in civil matters generally, must be raised in the petition. I.C.
§ 19-4903; I.R.C.P. 3(a). The mechanism provided for raising new claims is a motion to

amend the petition. I.R.C.P. 15(a) (after answer filed a pleading may be amended "only
by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party"). Where a post-conviction
petitioner asserts new claims in response to a notice of intent to dismiss, but does not
move to amend the petition to include the new claims, a district court does not err in
declining to consider the new claims. Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107, 111, 15 P.3d 820,
824 (2000).

g

Here, no motion to amend was made, and no amendment occurred. The district
court was not required to consider the new issue asserted for the first time in Newman's
reply brief in the absence of a motion to amend.

Allowing unlimited amendment in

response to a motion to dismiss or notice of intent to dismiss would cause delay and
confusion about what claims are actually asserted.

Newman's attempt on appeal to

have his response to the notice of intent to dismiss treated as a de facto amendment of
his petition should be rejected.

11.
Newman Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination That His
Claims Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Did Not Present A Genuine Issue Of
Material Fact Under Strickland
A.

Introduction
The district court summarily dismissed all of Newman's claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel upon finding that he failed to present a genuine issue of material
fact in regard to deficient performance and prejudice, the two requirements of Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 3 On appeal, Newman contends the district court
erred by parsing out the prejudicial effect of each claimed deficiency of trial and
appellate counsels' performance, and argues that the court should have, instead,
considered the cumulative effect of counsel's deficient performance. (Appellant's Brief,
pp.15-16.)
3

Although the district court's order granting the state's motion for summary dismissal
said Newman "has raised sufficient issues of fact relating to the first prong of the
Strickland standard ... relating to at least certain of his claims," the court did not identify
those claims. (#38281 R., Vol. II, p.293.) As will be shown, in its individual review of
Newman's claims, the district court concluded, either expressly or in effect, that all of
Newman's failed to meet each one of Strickland's requirements.
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Newman has failed to show any error in the district court's determination that his
eight claims failed to meet both requirements of Strickland, whether considered
individually or collectively.

B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the

appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists
which, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require relief to be granted.

Nellsch v.

State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). The court freely reviews
the district court's application of the law.

C.

~

at 434, 835 P.2d at 669.

Standards Applicable To Summary Dismissal In Post-Conviction Proceedings
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a civil proceeding in which the

petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he is entitled to relief by a
preponderance of the evidence.

I.C. § 19-4907; Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869,

801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 315, 900 P.2d 221 223
1

(Ct. App. 1995).

A petition for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an

ordinary civil action in that it must contain more than "a short and plain statement of the
claim" that would suffice for an ordinary civil complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1). Dunlap v.
State, 141 Idaho 50, 56 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269,
1

271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813,816,892 P.2d
488, 491 (Ct. App. 1995). Idaho law requires the petition to present or be accompanied

11

by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to
summary dismissal. LC. § 19-4903.
Summary dismissal of an application for post-conviction relief is authorized by
LC. § 19-4906, either pursuant to a motion by a party or on the trial court's own
initiative. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437,444, 180 P.3d 476, 483 (2008). Summary
dismissal is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under LR.C.P. 56,
"permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material
fact that, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the relief
requested." Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444, 180 P.3d at 483; Charboneau v. State, 140
Idaho 789,792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517,518,960
P.2d 738, 739 (1998); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App.
1994). A material fact has "some logical connection with the consequential facts" and is
determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties. Yakovac,
145 Idaho at 444, 180 P.3d at 483.
Summary dismissal may be appropriate even where the state does not controvert
the applicant's evidence because the court is not required to accept either the
applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the
applicant's conclusions of law. Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 321, 900 P.2d
795, 797 (1995); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App.
1994). "When an action is to be tried before the court without a jury, the judge is not
constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary
judgment but rather the trial judge is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be

12

drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts." Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444, 180 P.3d at
483 (quoting Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275
(1991 )).
Summary dismissal is also proper if the applicant fails to present sufficient proof
to establish a prima facie case with respect to each element of the petitioner's claim for
relief.

Kuehl v. State, 145 Idaho 607, 609-10, 181 P.3d 533, 535 (Ct. App. 2008);

Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).

D.

Newman Failed To Present Any Issue Of Material Fact Requiring An Evidentiary
Hearing On The Dismissed Claims
Newman contends his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel created

material issues of fact as to whether his counsels' alleged deficient performance
cumulatively showed

prejudice because counsels'

errors

resulted

in

Newman

presenting the absurd defense at trial that denied he was present in the victim's home
when the crimes occurred.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.13-19.)

Newman's arguments fail.

The district court correctly found his claims failed to meet either one of the two prongs of
Strickland, deficient performance and prejudice.

Additionally, because none of

Newman's claims were supported with evidence of any prejudice, Newman's argument
that the court failed to cumulate what it found did not exist is without merit. 4 See, e.g.,
Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 632 (9 th Cir. 1997) (finding no cumulative prejudice

4

The state notes that it is not always appropriate to look at cumulative prejudice arising
from differing acts of deficient performance, only that it may, in some circumstances, be
appropriate to do so. See Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616,632 (9 th Cir. 1997);
Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1333 (9th Cir. 1978) ("prejudice may result from the
cumulative impact of multiple deficiencies").
13

where claims showed either no deficient performance or no prejudice individually). A
review of each of Newman's claims shows he failed to raise any genuine issue of
material fact as to whether his counsels' performance was deficient and prejudiced his
case.

1.

Failure To Obtain Test Results Of Swab Samples From Sink

Newman complained in his affidavit supporting his amended petition that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain test results or seek independent testing of
swabs taken from the victim's bathroom sink for the presence of urine and DNA. 5
(#38281 R., Vol. I, p.30.) He asserted:
(a) one of the victims claims that whoever sexually assaulted her urinated
in the bathroom sink. I knew that I had not sexually assaulted the victim
and that I had not urinated in the sink. The State had taken samples from
the sink to test forensically. I asked [defense counsel] to obtain the test
results and subpoena the test results to trial because I knew the urine was
not mine. [Defense counsel] did not obtain the test results prior to trial and
he did not subpoena the test results to trial. Had [defense counsel]
followed up on this forensic evidence, the jury would have found me not
guilty of the crimes related to sexual assault because the urine in the sink
was not mine.
(#38281 R., Vol. II, p.285.)
The district court rejected Newman's claim, and in obvious reference to the
deficient performance requirement of Strickland, explained that the trial testimony
showed "no urine was found on the swabs through the State's forensic testing," and
5

Newman's "First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief" contained the same
claims as his original petition, but his supporting affidavit set forth three additional
claims under his petition's first claim (claim "7b") that his trial counsel failed to request
and review "all discovery materials prior to trial and by not issuing jury trial subpoenas
for key pieces of DNA evidence." (#38281 R., Vol. I, p.38; #38281 R., Vol. II, p.265.)
This is the first of those three additional claims.
14

concluded that Newman failed to present admissible expert testimony demonstrating
"how the alleged attacker's DNA would be on the swabs when there was no urine
detected on them, or how any possible DNA was linked to the alleged attacker."
(#38281 R., Vol. I, p.30.) The court noted that Newman had been given the opportunity
to conduct additional discovery, but was still unable to produce admissible evidence as
to what an expert would have concluded if further testing of the swabs had been done.
(Id.) Newman has failed to show any error in the district court's determination.
In regard to "prejudice," the district court determined Newman failed to show how
"such expert would have evaluated the DNA evidence so as to allow a finding that the
probable outcome of the case would have been different." (#38281 R., Vol. II, pp.285286.)

The district court deemed Newman's arguments "purely conclusory and

speculative," and summarized:
Newman has not presented any evidence, admissible at an evidentiary
hearing, that there was any DNA evidence on the swabs collected from
the bathroom sink that would have resulted in a different outcome at trial if
such evidence had been submitted.
(#38281 R., Vol. II, p.286.)
Newman has failed to show error relative to the summary dismissal of this claim.
Newman failed to demonstrate through admissible evidence that his trial counsel
performed deficiently by not obtaining additional testing of the sink swabs on the mere
hope such testing would, for the first time, detect the presence of urine (and DNA), nor
did he show how such testing would have resulted in a different outcome of his trial.
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2.

Failure To Interview And Subpoena The "Second Participant"

The second additional claim contained in Newman's affidavit supporting his
amended petition was that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not interview
and subpoena to trial the "other person" involved in his crimes, and Newman could have
shown through a "timeline of events" that it was impossible for him to have committed all
the charged offenses himself.

(#38281 R., Vol. I, pp.30-31.)

Newman alleged he

informed his trial counsel about the other participant, and if that person had been
subpoenaed for trial, he would have "asserted his Fifth Amendment rights or else been
subject to cross examination about his role in the crime," and the jury would have had a
reasonable doubt about Newman's guilt. (#3828'1 R., Vol. I, p.31.)
The district court was not persuaded by Newman's claim, explaining in unstated
reference to Strickland's "deficient performance" requirement, that his contention was
"entirely conclusory," and even though he "identified another participant by name during
his Pre-Sentence Investigation prior to sentencing," he failed to present any statements
under oath "concerning what the purported evidence would have been," and also failed
to present facts "under oath concerning this purported 'time line' and the purported
involvement of the other person." (#38281 R., Vol. II, p.286.) The court concluded:
To withstand a summary disposition challenge, Newman needed to have
presented a cogent statement of what facts would be testified to relating to
the additional perpetrator, either through his affidavit or through the
affidavit of a person with knowledge. He has failed to do so.
(#38281 R., Vol. II, p.287.) Newman did not reveal what the other person would have
testified to at trial, nor did he explain how a time-line would have specifically shown it
impossible for him to have committed the crimes alone. Newman failed to demonstrate
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to the district court that his trial counsel performed deficiently by not subpoenaing the
"other person" involved in Newman's crimes, and for not creating a time-line of events.
Moreover, because Newman has made no attempt to show the district court erred in its
"deficient performance" analysis in regard to this claim, this Court should affirm on that
unchallenged basis.
In regard to prejudice, the district court properly determined there was "no way [it]
could conclude that had the jury been presented with this unspecified evidence, the
outcome of the trial would have been different." (#38281 R., Vol. II, p.286.) Newman
has failed to show any error in the district court's summary dismissal of this claim.

3.

Failure To Obtain DNA Testing Of Fingernail Clippings And Scrapings

The third and last additional claim presented in Newman's affidavit supporting his
amended petition asserted his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain test
results from his fingernail clippings and scrapings, and for failing to subpoena the test
results to trial. (#38281 R., Vol. I, p.31.) Newman's claim is based upon his assumption
that, if he had sexually assaulted the victim in the bathroom, her DNA would have likely
been found in his fingernail clippings and scrapings. (Id. ("Again, the State expected to
find the victim's DNA under my fingernails since I had allegedly sexually assaulted
her.").)
In summarily dismissing this claim, the district court first noted that, according to
the state's response to discovery, "although Newman's hands were bagged, no
fingernail clippings or scrapings were obtained[,]" and "whether or not there were
samples taken, it does not appear that any forensic testing was ever done by the State
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on fingernail scrapings or clippings from the Petitioner." (#38281 R., Vol. 11, p.287.) In
explaining, in effect, that Newman failed to show his trial counsel's performance was
deficient, the district court stated, "Newman does not present any evidence to the court
concerning what the DNA evidence would have demonstrated, and offers only
conclusory and speculative arguments." (#38281 R., Vol. II, p.288.) The district court
correctly found that Newman failed to meet his burden of showing what the results of
DNA testing of his fingernail clippings and scrapings would have been - even assuming
such clippings and scrapings were done. 6 Newman failed to demonstrate to the district
court that his counsel's performance was deficient, and, on appeal, he has not
challenged the district court's conclusions in that regard; this Court should affirm the
district court's decision on this unchallenged basis.
The district court also correctly concluded that Newman "failed to demonstrate
any material issue of fact concerning how the lack of victim DNA under his fingernails
would have altered the outcome of the trial." (#38281 R., Vol. 11, p.288; see also fn. 6,
supra.)

The court explained that even if DNA testing had been done on Newman's

6

In its Supplemental Argument on the Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss, the state
argued:
Further, there is no evidence that the victim's attacker should be
expected to have the victims' [sic] DNA under his fingernails. The victim
testified that when she was struggling with the attacker, the attacker had
on gloves and she was covered with her robe. The only time the attacker
touched her without gloves was when he was "rubbing" her vagina. There
was no testimony that she was scrapped [sic] or injured by the attacker in
any way. Newman has provided no evidence that would suggest the
victim's attacker would have the victim's DNA under his fingernails and,
therefore, the absence of it under Newman's [sic] would be exculpatory.
(#38281 R., Vol. II, p.235.)
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fingernail clippings and scrapings, the absence of the victim's DNA would not have
affected the outcome of trial, and further stated:
[T]he nature and extent of the other trial evidence against [Newman] was
compelling, including the victim's contention that only one person was
involved in the attack on her; that she heard only one voice in the
bathroom where the sexual assault took place; that the attacker talked to
her constantly during those events; that she recognized Newman's voice
from when he had lived next door to her a few months earlier; that she
recognized Newman's shoes because she had seen them before; and that
despite being told that a second person would stay behind to watch the
home to make sure she didn't call police, she immediately contacted the
police and there was no evidence of anyone else being present. There
was no other evidence to suggest that more than one person was in the
house at the time the crimes were committed.
(#38281 R., Vol. II, p.288.) Additionally, the victim testified that the person who sexually
assaulted her was the same man who took the keys to her husband's truck from her
hand. (#30796 Tr., p.155, L.1 - p.156, L.7.) Newman's DNA (used chewing tobacco)
was subsequently found in that same truck, in a trash sack that had been removed from
the victim's bathroom garbage sack. (#30796 Tr., p.139, L.9 - p.140, L.1 O; p.278, L.2 p.279, L.20; p.500, L.13 - p.503, L.4; p.523, L.11 - p.525, L.12.)
Given the evidence presented at trial showing that Newman sexually assaulted
the victim in the bathroom of her home, the district court properly found that even if the
victim's DNA was not underneath Newman's fingernails, he still failed to "raise[] any
genuine issue of material fact concerning the second prong of the Strickland standard,"
prejudice. (#38281 R., Vol. II, p.289.) Newman has not shown any error in the district
court's determination that he failed to demonstrate prejudice in regard to this claim.
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4.

Failure To Meet With Newman And Provide Discovery

Newman's fourth and fifth claims, claims "7c" and "7d" in his amended petition
(#38281 R., Vol. I, pp.38-39), alleged that his trial attorney failed to meet with him and
give him discovery before trial, which kept Newman from adequately assisting in his
defense, and prevented him from creating a time line of events to show the state's case
was incorrect. However, Newman did not explain precisely how a time line would have
shown he could not have sexually assaulted the victim. Newman also alleged - without
providing details - that he was unable to identify potential witnesses and obtain
exculpatory evidence, and that the testimony of witnesses who were either directly or
indirectly involved would have given the jury reasonable doubt about the State's time
line and version of events. (#38281 R., Vol. I, pp.31-34 (Affidavit of James Newman),
38-39 (amended petition).)
The district court found that Newman "fail[ed] to support his allegations with
admissible evidence from a person having knowledge," and "d[id] not provide factual
information concerning (a) what evidence would be introduced to refute the State's
version of events, (b) who would testify in contradiction to the State's version of events,
and (c) what would be the substance of such testimony." (#38281 R., Vol. II, p.289.)
The court concluded that Newman's "factual allegations are conclusory and
unsupported by admissible evidence." (Id.) Although not expressly stated, the district
court's determination that Newman's claim was conclusory and that he failed to support
his claim with admissible evidence and factual information is tantamount to finding that
Newman failed to demonstrate his trial counsel's performance was deficient. Further,
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on appeal, because Newman has not attempted to show any error in the district court's
ruling pertaining to trial counsel's alleged deficient performance, this Court should affirm
the district court's decision on that unchallenged basis.
Inasmuch as the district court's order granting the state's motion for summary
dismissal concluded that Newman failed "to satisfy the second prong of the Strickland
test concerning any of his claims" (#38281 R., Vol. II, p.293 (emphasis original)), the
court obviously found that Newman had failed to demonstrate prejudice in regard to this
claim.

Indeed,

because Newman's allegations were unsupported by specific

information in the form of admissible evidence, he not only failed to show how his
attorney's performance was deficient, but also failed to demonstrate how such
performance may have prejudiced the outcome of his trial. Newman has failed to show
any error in the district court's summary dismissal of this claim.

5.

Failure To Challenge Admissibility Of DNA From Trash Bag

Newman next claimed that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by
failing to challenge "the admissibility of DNA evidence from saliva found in a trash bag
even though there were obvious chain of custody problems with the evidence." (#38281
R., Vol. I, p.39 (claim "7e").) As previously noted, the victim testified that the person
who sexually assaulted her was the same man who took the keys to her husband's
truck from her hand (#30796 Tr., p.155, L.1 - p.156, L.7), and Newman's DNA was later
found that truck, in a trash sack that had been taken from the victim's bathroom.
(#30796 Tr., p.139, L.9 - p.140, L.1 O; p.278, L.2 - p.279, L.20; p.500, L.13 - p.503, L.4;
p.523, L.11 - p.525, L.12.)
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Although Newman complains that his trial counsel should have moved to
suppress the DNA evidence because of an inadequate chain of custody, the district
court properly concluded that he failed to "demonstrate what chain of custody issue
existed; that any chain of custody challenge would have been successful; or that a
motion to suppress or motion in limine would have been successful." (#38081 R., Vol.
11, p.290.) The court accurately observed that it was "required to examine the probability
of success of a motion in order to determine whether counsel's decision against
pressing the motion was within the wide range of permissible discretion and sound trial
strategy." (#38081 R., Vol. II, p.290 (citing Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 579, 976
P.2d 927, 944 (1999).)

Based on Newman's complete failure to demonstrate any

shortcomings of the chain of custody of the DNA evidence from the trash found in the
victim's husband's truck, and that a motion to preclude such evidence would have been
successful, the court's concluding remarks on this claim specifically ruled Newman
failed to meet either of Strickland's two required showings:
[Newman] does not set forth facts and argument by which the court can
find that a question of fact exists relating to whether trial counsel's
performance was defective in this regard, or whether the outcome of the
jury trial would have been different. [Newman] again relies on conclusory
and speculative assertions instead of a statement of facts to support his
contentions.
(#38081 R., Vol. II, p.290.) Newman has failed to show any error in the district court's
summary dismissal of this claim.
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6.

Failure To Communicate About Plea Negotiations And Follow Directions
To Reach A Plea Agreement

Newman alleged that his trial attorney failed to communicate with him concerning
plea negotiations, and failed to follow Newman's directions to obtain a plea agreement.
(#38081 R., Vol. I, p.39 (claim "7f").) Newman's affidavit added little to his claim, as he
merely added that his attorney did not visit him as requested and "refused to parlay the
information [Newman] had about drug activity into effective plea negotiation." (#38081
R., Vol. I, p.33.) Newman asserted that if his attorney had done as requested, he "could
have resolved the case by plea negotiation." (Id.)
The district court instantly recognized the conclusory and unsupported nature of
Newman's claim, and properly held that he failed to meet either one of Strickland's two
requisites:
The only evidence raised by Newman concerning a plea bargain was the
hearsay statement of his sister, Julie Skovgard, whose affidavit
represented that trial counsel allegedly told her that a plea bargain was
offered, but that it was not relayed to [Newman] because it was not
favorable.
The court does not find that [Newman] has raised a material issue
of fact concerning defective performance relating to failure to secure a
plea bargain. However, even if there was an issue of fact concerning trial
counsel's performance, the Petitioner has not supplied admissible
evidence that satisfies the second prong of the Strickland standard.
(#38081 R., Vol. II, p.291.)
The district court correctly held that Newman failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact about whether, under Strickland, his counsel's performance in obtaining a
plea agreement was deficient and that he suffered prejudice.

Absent any specific

allegations as to how counsel's performance was deficient, or how Newman was
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specifically prejudiced by such performance, the district court properly summarily
dismissed this claim.

7.

Failure To More Aggressively Pursue Disqualification Of Judge

Newman next claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to
more aggressively pursue the disqualification of Judge Goff as the presiding trial judge.
(#38081 R., Vol. I, p.39 (claim "7g").) Newman's supporting affidavit explained further:

I went to school with Judge Goff's son and, at one time, got into a physical
altercation with his son. I though [sic] that Judge Goff would judge me
more harshly because I had battered his son. [Defense counsel] did not
aggressively seek to disqualify Judge Goff based upon my history with his
son. Had [defense counsel] communicated with me he would have known
all the reasons I thought Judge Goff should be disqualified. Judge Goff
imposed a very harsh sentence in this case and, had Judge Goff been
disqualified, I would have received a more equitable sentence.
(#38081 R., Vol. I, pp.33-34.)
Newman's claim merely speculates, without any basis in fact, that Judge Goff
was aware of an incident that occurred "at one time" between his son and Newman and
continued to harbor ill-will towards Newman that caused him to sentence Newman
harshly. The district court responded appropriately to such a nebulous claim:
On direct appeal, [Newman's] sentence was upheld by the Idaho
Court of Appeals as not being an abuse of discretion. [Newman] has
failed to demonstrate, through admissible factual evidence, that there
would have been grounds to disqualify Judge Goff; that Judge Goff would
have imposed a more lenient sentence but for the alleged incident
between Newman and Judge Goff's son; or that another judge would have
sentenced him differently.
[Newman] relies on conclusions and
speculation.
(#38081 R., Vol. 11, p.292.) Newman has failed to show any error in the district court's
summary dismissal of this conclusory and unsupported claim.
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8.

Failure By Appellate Counsel To Communicate

Newman claimed that his appellate counsel failed to communicate with him
during the appeal process, and if counsel had communicated, "more issues could have
been presented on appeal which may have been successfully argued before the
appellate courts." (#38081 R., Vol. I, p.40 (claim "7h").) In his affidavit supporting his
amended petition, Newman further stated that he had "almost no input" in his direct
appeal, and that had his appellate counsel contacted him to discuss the issues Newman
believed important to present on appeal, he would have "related to him the information
contained in this Affidavit and the appellate courts would have remanded this case for a
new sentencing hearing because the sentence imposed was so harsh." (#38081 R.,
Vol. I, p.34.)
In summarily dismissing Newman's claim out-of-hand, the district court said:
Finally, [Newman] argues that appellate counsel's performance
deprived him of his constitutional rights by failing to communicate during
the appeals process, resulting in issues not being presented on appeal
that may have been successfully argued.
Petitioner has not identified what issues could have been presented
that were not. Thus, this allegation is conclusory and invites this court to
speculate.
(#38081 R., Vol. 11, p.292.) Newman has failed to show any error in the district court's
summary dismissal of Newman's wholly unsupported and unspecific claim.
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CONCLUSION
The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's summary
dismissal of Newman's post-conviction petition claims.
DATED this 18th day of November, 2011.
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